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AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE ON STARE DECISIS
LEWIS A. KORNHAUSER*

I.

INTRODUCTION

On what theory of adjudication do economic analyses of law rely?
To the normative question "How ought judges to decide cases?" some
economic analysts, though not all, respond: "Judges ought to decide
cases to promote efficiency." ' To the positive question "How do judges
decide cases?"-that is, "By what principles or practices of reasoning do
judges in fact decide cases?"-economic analysts of law have remained
silent.
In the study of substantive legal rules, this silence is explicable. After all, to the economic analyst the behavior of citizens or agents, not
judges, is central. Agents choose levels of care, they choose to form contracts, or to perform contracts all in light of the governing "legal rules."
These "legal rules," however, have significance for the agents only to the
extent that differing legal consequences attach to different choices; expected liability, fines, or criminal sentence may all vary with the agent's
choice. If more than one legal consequence may follow from a given
action, then the agent must know the likelihood of each consequence.
Because, in the economic theory of legal behavior, the legal rule offers no
2
reason to act beyond the incentives provided by the legal consequences,
© 1989 Lewis A. Kornhauser.
*

Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. J.D. 1976, Ph.D. 1980, University

of California at Berkeley. I have incurred more debts in the writing of this essay than usual. I first
attempted to write about stare decisis while under the influence of the Provencal sun during the
summer of 1985. The hospitality of M. et Mme. D. Beranger in the Var was greatly appreciated.
During the summer of 1988 I benefitted from the hospitality of the Fleming School of Law at the
University of Colorado, Boulder. The Filomen d'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund of
the New York University School of Law has been generous in its support. The first draft was
presented to the Columbia Workshop on Law and Economics and the NYU Workshop on
Microeconomic Theory, the penultimate draft to a seminar at New York Law School. David Leebron commented insightfully on several drafts. Ricky Revesz and Larry Sager commented on the
penultimate draft. Remaining errors and obscurities are my responsibility.
1. Richard Posner has been the most prominent advocate of this normative thesis. See Posner.
Utilitarianism,Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979); Posner. The Ethicaland
Political Basis of the Efficiency Norn in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. R Ev. 487 (1980).
Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 485 (1980) addresses in detail this
normative claim.
2. This characterization of the economic theory of legal behavior applies to current practice
rather than to logical necessity. For further discussion, see Kornhauser, Legal Rules as Incentives, in
LAW AND ECONOMICS: DEVELOPMENTS, TENSIONS, PROSPECTS 27, 42-49 (N. Mercuro ed. 1989).
Attention to practices of legal reasoning will, of course, further complicate an analysis of a
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the particular source of a variation in a legal consequence is irrelevant to
the agent and hence to the economic analyst. Uncertainties in legal outcomes that result from imperfections in fact-finding are thus treated identically to those that result from indeterminancies in the legal obligation
that the agent faces.
Thus, though analysts often interpret various symbols in their (positive) models as "legal rules," this interpretation carries little, if any, commitment to a particular theory of law or adjudication. Mechanical
jurisprudence and extreme realism are with equal ease assimilable to the
economic models of substantive law. For mechanical jurisprudence,
legal rules are clear and applied uncontroversially to cases; knowledge of
these rules allows immediate inference of the consequences of an agent's
action. The extreme realist, on the other hand, explains judicial outcomes in terms of the predilections of the judge. Predictability of legal
consequences then depends simply on knowledge of the distribution of
predilections among judges.
While this silence may well serve the study of substantive law, it
seems inappropriate for the study of the judicial process itself. Yet the
few efforts to apply economic analysis to this process have also functioned with (at best) crude conceptions of adjudication. 3 Given the aims
of this literature, such crudity may have been justified. 4 Adjudication,
however, seems a natural subject to which to apply economic analysis.
substantive legal rule. Section 2 of Legal Rules as Incentives notes that the economic analysis of legal
duties has a simple structure: as the legal rule determines the game that agents play. judicial choice
of a legal rule reduces to choice among the equilibria of the induced games. Presumably an economic analysis of legal reasoning will examine the choice of a judicial practice of interpretation.
This practice will determine what rules judges adopt in particular cases; these rules in turn will
determine the game that agents play. The discussion in Section VI illustrates this structure.
3. I have in mind two strands of the literature. Consider first the literature on the evolutionary theory of the common law, in particular, Cooter & Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law
Without the Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1980); Goodman, An Economic Theoly of the
Evolution of the Common Law, 7 J. LEGAt STUD. 393 (1978); Landes & Posner. Adjudication as a
Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979); Priest, The Common Law Process anid the Selection of
Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL. STUD. 65 (1977); Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?. 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 51 (1977). These articles rely only on differentiating some feature of the process subject to
agent choice from the rest of process. Thus, the models in Rubin. Priest. and Cooter and Kornhauser, for example, simply isolate the decision to litigate from the rest of the amorphous view of a
"legal rule." Admittedly, the interpretation of these models identifies one aspect as the legal rule (or
the judicial process); but the model itself imposes little structure on this "rule" or "process."
An earlier strand in the literature addressed the process of rulemaking in general. In two provocative articles, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAl. STUD. 235 (1979), and Legal Precedent:
A Theoretical anid Empirical Analysis, 19 J. LAW & ECON. 249 (1976), Landes and Posner pursue
several interesting questions, in particular why dispute resolution and rule generation should be
jointly produced by courts. In their model of precedent, prior decisions serve as inputs into future
decisions but the discussion does not require attention to the specificities of legal reasoning.
4. The evolutionary theories asked to what extent the actual incentives faced by agents depended on the agents' own choices rather than upon choices of actors "within" the judicial system.
The models thus had no need to distinguish formally among elements of the judicial system.
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Adjudication after all is a decision process; and judicial systems have
clear, reasonably simple structures. Jurisprudential debate about legal
practice, moreover, has been extended, heated, and inconclusive.
In this essay, I propose to take legal reasoning seriously. I focus on
a limited aspect of the practice of precedent, often called stare decisis. In
section II, I frame the problem in two respects. First, I sketch the substantive contours of a practice that, paradoxically, demands that a court
adhere to a prior decision it believes wrong. Second, I suggest that justifications for stare decisis may vary with the institutional framework.
Section III explicates the idea of a "wrongly decided" case. In section
IV, I survey, from an economic perspective, jurisprudential justifications
for the practice. Each of the final two sections offers a heuristic model of
the practice of stare decisis. Each model focuses on a distinct source of
error identified in section III. In the first model, I explore "reliance"
justifications grounded on errors resulting from "legal uncertainty." In
the second model, I examine similar justifications grounded on errors
resulting from uncertainty about the world. These models, I believe,
highlight the difficulty of justifying stare decisis when one makes precise
both the practice and the institutional context in which it occurs.
Though the heuristic models illustrate the difficulty of justifying
stare decisis, this essay should not be understood as a rejection of that
practice. After all, prior to the formulation of the models, I suggest at
least four clusters of justification for the practice, each of which might
apply in one of four institutional contexts. Each heuristic model addresses an interpretation of one justification in one specific institutional
context. Consequently, at most two of the possible sixteen different strategies for justifying stare decisis receive any detailed examination.

II.

FRAMING THE PROBLEM

Each theory of adjudication offers a different view of how a judge
decides a case, the consequences (for other judges) of her decision, and
the justification for these consequences. Currently, debate rages over the
extent, if any, to which future judges are "bound" by the decisions of
prior cases. 5 This debate over "precedent" has many facets and divisions
5. The question at the core of the debate contains an equivocation. The claim might be either
that judges are not in Jt'ci bound by prior decisions or that judges ought not to be bound by prior
decisions. This equivocation may account for the fact that parties have taken more than two -'sides."
The claims of some critical legal scholars that the law is "indeterminate" may be interpreted as a
claim that prior decisions do not (perhaps cannot) bind current judges. See. e.g., Kennedy. Toward
Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A CriticalPhenomenology of Judging. 36 J. LF.GA EDuc.
518 (1986). In opposition to this position. Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. Ri'v. 571 (1987). argues
that past legal decisions do in fact constrain current judges. Dworkin apparently opposes both thesc
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for the term "precedent" covers a complex institutional practice.
A.

Stare Decisis and the Practice of Precedent

The term "precedent" covers a broad class of practices employed in
rendering judicial decisions. 6 In this essay, I focus on one narrow aspect
of the practice of precedent: stare decisis. Phrased in its starkest form,
stare decisis "requires" a judge, once she has determined that the instant
case is governed by a prior decision, to adhere to that prior decision even
when she believes that prior decision to have been wrongly decided.
Clearly, one cannot fully understand the practice of stare decisis unless one also resolves two prior (and interrelated) questions: (1) What
criteria determine when two cases are "alike?" and (2) What principle or
legal rule does a given case articulate? 7 That is, what outcome does the
prior case require?8 In this essay, though, I attend only indirectly to the
equivalence criteria, and I further assume, despite the difficulties of extracting a ratio decidendum of a case, that the rule of the case is clear and
known to all parties. Instead, I concentrate on a third question: What
justifies adherence to a decision known to be wrong?
To begin one must clarify the sense in which a decision is "known to
be wrong" or is "wrongly decided." At least two ambiguities plague this
formulation of stare decisis. To disentangle the first ambiguity, suppose
a judge determines that Instant Case is equivalent to Prior Case and
hence must be decided identically. Does "wrongly decided" refer to both
Instant Case and Prior Case or to Instant Case only? The equivalence of
Instant Case and Prior Case seems to imply that both must be wrong (or
both correct) but, as section III argues, for some sources of error, Instant
Case may be wrong though Prior Case was rightly decided. Not surprisingly, then, each source of error suggests a different justification for stare
decisis.
Second, the content, as well as the reference, of "wrongly decided"
positions as he believes that, though legal decisions are constrained, political and legal history as a
whole, rather than any specific legal decision, ought to bind (and in fact does bind) judges. R.
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).

6. For a general introduction to the vast literature on precedent and legal reasoning, one may
consult R. CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1977); E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL REASONING (1949); K. LiLEWELILYN, THI COMMON LAW TRADITION (1960); W. TWINING
& D. MIERS, How TO Do THINGS WITH RULES (2d ed. 1982).

7. These two questions differ from another question that preoccupies lawyers and legal theorists: what is the rationale for the decision in a given case? This question too receives only indirect
attention; its resolution "appears" in the "substantive values" postulated in Section III(B)(1) below.
8. When the House of Lords announced in 1966 that it would abandon its practice of strict
stare decisis, attention in England focused on a third question that I shall not discuss at all: Is the
rule of stare decisis or the practice of precedent more generally a legal rule? Put differently. what
obligation does the judge have to adhere to the practice?
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is ambiguous. Obviously, "wrongly decided" (in reference to Instant
Case) cannot here mean "wrongly decided all things considered." A justification of stare decisis must offer a compelling reason why the precedent of Prior Case renders a particular decision proper for Instant Case,
even though, absent the decision in Prior Case, it would be wrong to
reach that decision in Instant Case. Put differently, if stare decisis is
justified, Instant Case must be decided correctly "all things considered"
because stare decisis is one thing to consider.
B.

The Institutional Context of Adjudication

Actual court systems have complex institutional structures. Theories of adjudication, on the other hand, assume explicitly or implicitly
very simple institutional structures. As the institutional structure bears
on the nature and force of justification for stare decisis, a few simple
distinctions among models of courts will clarify much of the later
discussion.
This essay identifies four different models of courts. First, one might
consider a single judge who hears every case that arises in the jurisdiction. Call this model the "unitary judge" model. Much of H.L.A. Hart's
discussion of open texture and judicial discretion applies to this model. 9
Second, one might consider a single court that hears every case in the
jurisdiction but, in this instance, the single judge on the court is finitelived so that not every case will be heard by the same judge. I shall call
this model the "sequential judge model." Dworkin emphasizes this aspect of adjudication in his interpretive theory of legal practice.10 Third,
one might consider a single court consisting of many co-equal judges,
only one of whom hears any given case. Intermediate courts of appeal
have a similar structure; they differ only in that a panel of three (or five
or whatever) hears each case. This model will be the "panel" model.
Fourth, one might consider a hierarchy of courts, each of which has a
Let this model be the "hierarchical
single, infinite-lived judge on it.
court" model.
Among these four models, the unitary court model presents the
most difficult context in which to justify stare decisis. In part, difficulties
arise in the unitary model because, as section III will suggest, it offers
only limited opportunity for error to occur. By contrast, the hierarchical
CONCE PT OF LAW 121-32
Supra note 5, at 228-38 (1986).

9. See generally H.L.A. HART. THIi
10.

See generally R.

11. This

DWORKIN.

(1961).

set of distinctions does not exhaust possible institutional configurations of courts. Per-

haps the most important omission is that of multi-judge panels, an issue discussed in Kornhauser &
Sager, Unpacking the Courl. 96 Y ,tI L.J. 82 (1986).
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court model presents the easiest justificatory context; not only does a
hierarchical system present multiple occasions for error but also various
''managerial" reasons for control and uniformity arise.
The panel and sequential judge models differ in only one respect. In
a panel model, two instant cases (that arise simultaneously) might be
decided by different judges; in the sequential judge model, two instant
cases will be decided by the same judge.
III.

THREE SOURCES OF JUDICIAL ERROR

Every justification of stare decisis must dissolve the paradoxical directive, stated above, that a judge adhere to a prior decision she knows to
be wrong. The nature of "error" that the prior judge might have committed, then, will play a central role in any justificatory strategy. Below I
distinguish four sources of error: changes in values, changes in the
world, improvements in information, and incompetence. Though each of
these sources of errors may be characterized abstractly, one more easily
grasps each concept in a specific decisional context.
A.

An Exemplary Class of Cases

Consider accidents between drivers and pedestrians, each of whom
chooses both a level of care and a level of activity (e.g., number of miles
driven or walked per day). Assume that only the pedestrian is injured in
these accidents. Courts must choose the rule of liability that governs
these accidents. A rule of liability is characterized by standards of care
for each party and a "pattern of liability" which determines who bears
the loss as a function of the parties' adherence to or breach of their respective standards of care. Usually we contrast a rule of negligence with
contributory negligence (negligence for short) to a rule of strict liability
with dual contributory negligence (strict liability for short). Under negligence with contributory negligence, the pedestrian bears the cost of the
accident unless the driver is negligent (or fails to meet her standard of
care) and the pedestrian is non-negligent.' 2 Strict liability with dual
contributory negligence is the mirror image; the driver bears the costs of
1 3
the accident unless the pedestrian is negligent and the driver is not.
12.

Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
13.
Driver
Driver

Negligence thus yields the following patterns of liability:

Negligent
+
Pedestrian Non-Negligent
Negligent
+
Pedestrian Negligent
Non-Negligent
+
Pedestrian Non-Negligent
Non-Negligent
+
Pedestrian Negligent
Strict liability thus yields the following pattern of liability:
Negligent
+
Pedestrian Non-Negligent
Negligent
+
Pedestrian Negligent

=

Driver Liable
No Liability
No Liability
No Liability
Driver Liable
Driver Liable
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In this example, the "prior" case articulates either a rule of negligence or of strict liability. 14 The example leaves open the question of
when two cases are alike. We might say that two cases are alike when
the drivers in each take identical levels of care and when the pedestrians
adopt identical levels of care. Alternatively, we might say that two cases
are alike if the drivers face identical costs of care and the pedestrians face
identical costs of care or that the benefits that each type of actor accrues
from undertaking her activity remain unchanged.15
B.

Sources of JudicialError

Under what circumstances would a court believe a prior decision to
be wrong and therefore confront stare decisis in its starkest form? 16 Consider the accident example in which we may identify four "sources" of
error. Three of these apply to any of the four models of the judicial
process; one applies only to the sequential and hierarchical models.
1. Changes in Values
Suppose that the court initially announced a negligence rule. An
"identical case" now arises. If the subsequent judge (call her Liza) differs
from the prior judge (call him Henry), she may believe the first case was
wrongly decided because her "values" differ from his. Both Henry and
Liza must bring to bear both substantive and formal values in deciding a
case. Substantive values dictate the outcome in particular cases; they
Driver Non-Negligent
+
Pedestrian Non-Negligent
=
Driver Liable
Driver Non-Negligent
+
Pedestrian Negligent
No Liability
14. Of course, other legal questions are also implicit in this example. Most importantly. the
court must formulate the standards of care against which the finder of fact will measure the parties'
conduct. I focus on the choice between negligence and strict liability for several reasons. First, the
choice is purely legal. Because of the formulation of the standard of care as a judgmental criterion.
questions about the standard frequently mix questions of fact and questions of law. Could any
reasonable juror have reached, on the record of the case, the decision this jury did? Second, the
dichotomous nature of the choice between negligence and strict liability is crucial to justifications for
stare decisis; the standard of care is chosen from a wider range of alternatives.
15. Other options are also available. Most obviously, we might not admit that two cases are
equivalent unless each driver and each pedestrian has adopted identical levels of both care and activity. The nature of the legal rule apparently excludes this formulation because it conditions liability
only on the choices of care levels. This formulation of the legal rule also apparently excludes various
other equivalence criteria: that the same driver and pedestrian be involved in each case, or that the
accidents occur on the same day of the year and at the same time of day.
Of course, neither logic nor policy requires that the substantive requirements of liability dictate
the equivalence criteria for cases. For further discussion, see infra note 19.
16. I ignore for the moment the question of the "force" or "weight" of stare decisis. We might
say that if the decision is "wrong" enough, then stare decisis ought to be abandoned. "Force" thus
requires some "measure" of strength of the reasons weighing against affirming the prior decision.
Such a measure may differ for the different sources of"error" discussed below. In the context of the
economic model discussed in Section VI a clear measure will exist and we will be able to determine
precisely the optimal "force" or "weight" of precedent.
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constitute the "goals" or "aims" of the judge or judicial system. "Formal" values determine when two cases are "equivalent" and hence ought
to be decided identically.
Liza may disagree with Henry over either substantive or formal values. Thus, Liza and Henry might agree that their cases are equivalent
but Liza simply believes that all cases of this type ought to be governed
7
by a strict liability rule rather than the negligence rule Henry invoked.'
Alternatively, Liza and Henry may differ over the criteria that make two
cases equivalent. Liza might believe that her case differs from that decided by Henry though Henry believes them identical. If stare decisis
requires Liza not only to adhere to Henry's decision in the prior case but
also to adhere to his formal equivalence criteria, then Liza would be
forced wrongly to decide the case before her (though she might agree
that Henry correctly decided his case)."'
2.

Changes in the World

Assume now that Liza and Henry share both substantive and formal
values. Suppose Liza and Henry believe that the legal rule should minimize the sum of the costs of accidents and accident prevention. The correct legal rule therefore depends upon the costs of care, the technology of
accident prevention, and the benefits that pedestrians and drivers receive
from their respective activities. Assume further that Liza and Henry
share the formal values that two cases are equivalent if drivers and
pedestrians adopted the same activity and care levels. Liza may still believe that, though Henry correctly decided the first case, changes in the
"world" render it wrong to follow Henry's decision in the instant case.
Liza might now believe the prior case "wrongly" decided, if the benefits that accrue from driving and walking have changed sufficiently. 19
17. Jovanovic, Rules vs. Discretion in the Legal Process, NYU Department of Economics (August, 1988) (unpublished paper), offers a model that justifies precedent in a panel model in which
judges differ in substantive values. In his model, however, error prevention (or competence) rather
than certainty justifies the rule.
18. The converse situation is more complex. As developed thus fat, stare decisis requires Liza
to accept Henry's substantive and procedural values. Henry has announced a rule of negligence in
Prior Case which, under his equivalence criterion, differs from Instant Case. Suppose now that Liza
believes Prior and Instant Case equivalent so that, writing on a clean slate, she would impose strict
liability in both cases. Stare decisis in itself would not compel Liza to follow Prior Case and announce a rule of negligence. Liza might, in the name of consistency or coherence, nonetheless "follow" Prior Case and announce a rule of negligence because stare decisis prevents Liza from
announcing the legal rule she believes best. Rather Liza must choose between two legal worlds: one
which treats like cases differently, some of them correctly. On consistency and coherence, see Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 11.
19. This example critically relies on the discrepancy between the substantive and formal values.
It would seem that the substantive value of "minimize social costs" should dictate the formal equivalence criteria as well as the substantive rule. That is, the substantive value identifies decision relevant
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Note that, on this understanding of the cases, Henry correctly decided
his case; that rule however is no longer appropriate for cases
"equivalent" to it. Finally, note that this argument does not depend on
the fact that Henry decided the first case and Liza the second. Liza
might just as well have decided both cases. Stare decisis requires the
"wrong" decision in the second case not because of the change in judicial
personnel but because of the change in the world.
3.

Improvements in Information

Though both the world and judicial values might remain constant,
the judge might learn more about the world and thus understand better
how she might implement her values. Some aspects of learning raise interesting questions that reach beyond the analysis of stare decisis. Learning, for example, might explain why courts decide only "cases and
controversies" rather than make general legal pronouncements.
With respect to stare decisis, however, this learning phenomenon
can be assimilated to either of the two prior reasons for error. One might
distinguish between "performance values" and "operational values."
Performance values constitute the general goals the judge seeks to meet.
Operational values result from the application of the performance values
to actual contexts. On this view, improved information implies a change
in operational values. An analysis of stare decisis when values change
should then illuminate an analysis of the practice when information
changes.20
facts of cases; specifically it would identify costs of care, technology, and benefit functions as decision
relevant. Moreover, the substantive value identifies actual care and activity levels as irrelevant to the
choice between strict liability and negligence, though the actual levels determine the application of
the legal rule to the particular case.
Part of the current debate over the "bindingness" of precedent turns on the linkage between
substantive and formal values. Schauer has argued that precedent binds because, though these
equivalence criteria (in his terminology "rules of relevance") are contingent, they are outside the
control of the judges. Schauer, supra note 5, at 571, 585. To the extent that substantive values are
determined within the legal system, then, the discrepancy between substantive and formal values
posited in the text may more easily occur.
On the other hand, as suggested in note 15, supra, legal practice tends erroneously to conflate
formal equivalence criteria with the antecedent conditions for the application of a legal rule. When
confronted with the task of comparing the current case with a past case, the court generally has
before it only those facts necessary for a finding of liability under the current legal rule. If the
equivalence criteria differ, the court cannot make the judgment about the applicability of stare decisis. In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, Ill N.E. 1050 (1916), for example. Cardozo
did not have before him the relevant information about the benefits of each activity that justify (on
economic grounds) a switch to strict liability.
20. Of course, changes (or differences) in performance values are most probable in models of
adjudication which have more than one judge. Informational changes may occur in the unitary
judge model. Thus, treating informational changes as changes in values extends any justification for
stare decisis based on changes in values from models with multiple judges to the unitary judge
model.
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On the other hand, one might include the informational state of the
court as part of the description of the state of the world. On this account, justifications of stare decisis when changes in the world occur
should illuminate an analysis of the practice when information changes.
This analogy, however, will be less appealing the greater the extent to
which the informational change depends on the court practice. If courts
learn because they adjudicate cases, then the practice will affect the rate
at which learning takes place. This potential interaction between the rate
of learning and the practice adopted may also undermine the analogy of
informational changes to value changes. Important as this interaction
may be, throughout the rest of the paper, effects of this type are ignored
and this source of error is assimilated to either changes in values or
changes in the world.
4.

Imperfect Decisionmaking

The fourth source of "error" is more complex. Assume that (1) substantive values are unchanging; (2) the (unchanging) formal values identify costs of care, technology, and benefits from the activities as the
decision relevant facts; (3) none of these facts are changing over time;
and (4) these facts are determined with error in any given case. These
errors in fact determination imply that the court unwittingly (and unknowingly) will wrongly decide many cases. On average, it might be better for the courts to ignore variations in some of the decision-relevant
facts. For instance, calculating the benefits received from the activities
might be subject to wider error than the determination of other decision
relevant facts; consequently, a court might think it wiser to adopt the
legal rule on the basis of the "average" level of benefits. 2 1 This source of
error might arise in any of the four models of adjudication.
Two observations may clarify the nature of this source of erroneous
decisions. First, the errors in fact-finding are not equivalent to changes
in the world. One might model errors in fact-finding probabilistically. A
case appears before the court. It has a true "type" A, but due to errors in
21. Heiner, Imperfect Decisions and the Law.- On the Evolution of Legal Precedent and Rules. 15
J. LEGAL STUD. 227 (1986), offers this lack of reliability or competence on the part of decisionmakers as a justification for the rule of stare decisis. As formulated in the text. this justification
has little appeal because the finder of fact differs from the finder of law. The legal rule thus seems to
be protecting against the fact finder's incompetence rather than the law finder's. A more plausible
example might have the following structure: the just decision might depend on many factors that
require complex deliberation. Two judges might thus resolve the same case differently (and hence at
least one of them would decide it wrongly). (As an analogy consider some complex set of mathematical calculations. Individuals doing the calculation may arrive at widely varying results and we
might do better to use an easy-to-calculate approximation if that approximation '*generally" gets
close to the right answer.)
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fact-finding, the court may classify it as a case of Type B or Type C. On
average, the court will interpret the facts correctly; though they err in
individual cases. The court faces an unchanging world; the correct decision in cases of Type A (and B and C as well) remain constant over time.
Second, judicial attention to this source of error requires judges to
alter their decisional perspective. The discussion thus far has assumed,
as discussions of adjudication generally assume, that each judge attempts
to decide the case before her correctly. A judge cognizant of her imperfection attempts to decide the class of cases to which the instant case
belongs correctly at the cost of deciding the instant case wrongly. Without a change in this decisional perspective, though, imperfect decisionmaking would not provide a justification for stare decisis. Suppose that
Henry, despite knowing of the errors in fact-finding, announced the rule
that he thought best for the prior case. Liza, knowing this, would have
good reason to believe that Henry had wrongly decided the prior case
and no reason to believe that his decision would be good on average for
"future" cases like hers. Imperfect decisionmaking, therefore, justifies
stare decisis only if each judge believes she should strive to announce a
rule good for the class of cases rather than the correct rule for specific
cases.
IV.

JURISPRUDENTIAL JUSTIFICATIONS OF STARE DECISIS

One might demand either a weak or a strong justification of stare
decisis. A weak justification entails only that a practice of stare decisis is
permissible but not necessarily required or even preferable to an adjudicatory system that eschews stare decisis. A strong justification, by contrast, offers a reason for the practice of stare decisis as opposed to its
renunciation. 22 Strong justifications are thus by their very nature comparative; according to the justificatory criterion an adjudicatory system
with stare decisis ranks, all other things equal, better than an adjudicatory system without it. The sources of error in prior decisions discussed
in section III (and the four models of adjudicatory systems defined in
section II B) suggest stable backgrounds against which we may compare
adjudication with stare decisis to adjudication without it. With these
sources of error in mind, then, we may evaluate (as strong justifications)
22. Justifications might differ in other ways. Much discussion of precedent has focused on its
"weight" or its "force," that is, the importance (to the outcome) of the prior decision relative to
other reasons for the decision. Force is of particular significance when the other reasons dictate a
different outcome. (These terms are not employed in a consistent fashion in the literature. For
some, "weight" refers to the scope of the rule and "force" to its power as against countervailing
reasons.)
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three complexes of reasons for a practice of stare decisis that emerge
from the jurisprudential literature: (1) Fairness; (2) Competence; and (3)
Certainty.
A.

Fairness

Casebooks, scholars, and judges intone the aphorism "Treat like
cases alike" with numbing regularity and with little elaboration of its
content. Concerns for "fairness" or "equality" are said to justify the
aphorism. Despite the prominence of this justification of stare decisis, it
may, for several reasons, be the most problematic of the three classes of
justifications generally proffered.
First, particularly in the context of the unitary court model, theorists tend incorrectly to assimilate the norm that "like cases be treated
alike" to the norm that litigants are entitled to a principled adjudication
of their claims. These two norms are in fact quite distinct. In a unitary
model, principled adjudication entails that a judge with invariant principles will decide cases that present identical grounds for decision identically. The practice of stare decisis, then, will differ from the norm of
principled adjudication, only if the single judge changes her principles.
In the other models, however, the principles on which judgment is rendered need not be uniform across judges; the apparent equivalence of
stare decisis and principled adjudication consequently dissolves. In a
panel model, for example, each judge might rigorously uphold the norm
of principled adjudication but differ from her colleagues on what constitute the appropriate principles. Similarly, the values of a single judge (in
the unitary model) might vary across time so that, though she rendered
principled decisions in both Prior and Instant Case, the judgment differed. In the single judge context, some confusion arises because we may
suspect a judge who frequently alters the principled basis of her decisions
of masking her true arbitrary (or capricious) grounds.
Conversely, a judge who decided cases arbitrarily, that is, on the
basis of "unprincipled" criteria, might arbitrarily choose to adhere to
stare decisis.2 3 For instance, Judge X might decide some class of cases
on the basis of the relative ages of the litigants, favoring the younger over
the older. As X ages, her personal preference might change so that absent her prior decisions, she would now favor the older over the younger.
23. A judge who decided cases whimsically or capriciously, on the other hand. could not adhere to stare decisis which, by its very nature, eliminates the spontaneity that characterizes whimsy
and caprice. As the text suggests, arbitrary decisionmaking differs in that it may be patterned
though the pattern rests on criteria that the culture considers illegitimate or irrelevant.
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Second, justifications of stare decisis that are grounded in "fairness"
will depend on the different conceptions of equality or fairness held by a
judge or legal system. The two distinct sources of these conceptions, in
the substantive and formal values of the judge, further complicates evaluation of fairness justifications. On the one hand, the equivalence criteria
seem to identify which cases ought to be treated alike. But the substantive values themselves will imply the "identity" of cases as well. At the
current stage of this discussion, however, we can disentangle two senses
of fairness, one corresponding to a unitary court system and one to a
sequential, panel, or hierarchical court.
In a unitary system, the command to treat like cases alike is directed
at the single judge so that the emphasis lies on the way Liza treats similarly situated parties. Under a rule of stare decisis, Liza will decide
"equivalent" cases identically despite "errors" while, in the absence of
stare decisis equivalent cases will be decided correctly but differently. In
what circumstances should the dictates of equal treatment prevail over
"error-correction"? Given the sketchy description of the practice of precedent, a definitive answer to this question is impossible. In general, the
nature of the fairness claim might depend on the content of the formal
equivalence criteria and substantive values.
Fairness appears to play this justificatory role when error results
from shifting values. As Liza decides all cases, any change in values
must result from shifts in her own values. If her substantive values
change, then the claim of fairness could rest on the nature of the formal
values that determine when two cases are equivalent for decisional purposes. On the other hand, if her formal values change, then any claim of
fairness, in this context, would seem to rest on a "reliance" interest of the
second set of parties, 24 an interest which also might apply if substantive
values had changed. In this instance, fairness then seems to reduce to the
claims of "certainty" discussed below.
If the error results from changes in the world, the force of a fairness
justification for stare decisis turns on the justification for the discrepancy
between Liza's substantive and formal values. Substantively, Liza believes the two cases differ in some decision-relevant way but formally she
believes they should be termed equivalent. Which set of values should
govern will depend on the specific content of each set of values and the
reasons for their discrepancy.
Finally, consider error that results from incompetence. Incompe24. It is possible that the new formal values dictate adherence to the old criteria of equivalence
but such an outcome is unlikely.
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tence implies that the court cannot reliably do justice to specific cases
within some class; on average, the court reaches a correct outcome more
frequently by adhering to some fixed rule rather than attempting to differentiate among cases. Incompetence thus seems to suggest that unlike
cases should be treated alike in the interests of promoting substantively
better outcomes. Fairness and incompetence thus appear to be at odds.
In a sequential, panel, or hierarchical system, the command "treat
like cases alike" may have a different sense. Perhaps fairness requires
that the result of the adjudication be independent of the judge who hears
the case. From this perspective, changes in the world still offer no obvious justification for stare decisis but both errors of incompetence and
changes in values do.
The presence of value uncertainty serves as a powerful motivation
for stare decisis. If judges have different substantive values but share
formal equivalence criteria, the outcome of a legal action would, in the
absence of (an effective practice of) stare decisis, depend critically on
which judge happened to hear the case. 25 If the two cases arose at the
same time in a hierarchical system, we would object to different outcomes, though the grounds other than "certainty" for this objection are
difficult to articulate. Errors of incompetence imply a similar variation
among "identical" cases as errors resulting from variation in values. In
the incompetence situation, however, courts may not be aware that two
cases decided differently are in fact identical. They know only, ex ante,
that they will make many errors in their determinations.
B.

Competence

This complex of reasons implicates two very different notions.
Competence may refer to the court's ability reliably to reach correct decisions as in the discussion of errors of fact-finding. As noted above, lack
of judicial reliability argues for treating "unlike" cases alike. Put differently, judicial competence might identify equivalence criteria that are
distinct from the substantive values of the court. Competence concerns
of this type are likely to be most pressing in non-unitary systems where a
25. The federal courts offer a variety of conflicting attitudes towards this problem. Within a
circuit court of appeal, a practice of stare decisis applies across panels; litigants appear to be entitled
to a decision independent of the panel that hears the case. Of course, stare decisis does not apply
across circuits. More interestingly, within a given district court, no practice of stare decisis prevails.
If both Liza and Henry sat on the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, neither would be bound to follow a decision of the other in a case each recognized as
equivalent. At the trial court level, then, litigants are apparently not entitled to a decision independent of the judge who hears the case.
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given judge may not trust the competence of lower court judges, subsequent judges, or her peers correctly to resolve complex legal issues.
Alternatively, competence refers not to the court's ability to decide
specific cases but its ability to handle its entire caseload. Adhering to
prior decisions permits the court to conserve its adjudicative resources; it
can therefore resolve more cases. To accomplish this goal, the equivalence criteria of cases must be more easily applied than the substantive
values that would be invoked to resolve the case de novo. Further, the
court might be willing to decide some cases wrongly if it saved sufficient
resources in so doing. On this account, then, stare decisis would dictate
not that a court adhere to a decision it believed wrong (or enforce a decision it believed wrong) but only that the court implement a decision not
knowing whether it were correct or not.
Recall the accident example. The court's substantive values might
dictate that it refer in each case to the technology of accident prevention,
the costs of care, and the benefits the parties derive from the activities.
The benefits derived from the activities however might be costly to determine in each case. Consequently, the court adopts equivalence criteria
that ignore this aspect of each case. Now, when a case arises under a
given legal rule, say negligence, the court will not know whether it correctly decides the second case or not as it will not inquire into the benefits
derived from the activities.
C

Certainty

"Certainty," as used in the jurisprudential literature, apparently
covers a congeries of interrelated ideas. To begin, distinguish "certain"
as "predictable" from "certain" as "unchanging" or "static." A changing world may be perfectly predictable and a static world highly unpredictable. To untangle these ideas requires careful attention not only to
the various senses of the term "certainty" but also to the source of error
under consideration and the nature of the legal rule.
Recall the description of the world with accidents between drivers
and pedestrians. Suppose, as will be done in the model of section VI, that
everything except the benefits to the agents is static. These benefits may
be perfectly predictable; we may know that they double every six
months. 26 Conversely, all the substantively relevant aspects of the world
may be unchanging, but some of them might be stochastic. In the acci26. On this account, the "predictable" world is also "static" if viewed from the appropriate
perspective "outside of time," as we know how the world changes with time. The world at time I
only "'changes" relative to the world at time t- I or 1

I
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dent example, when a driver sets out in her car, she may know all the
relevant facts but whether she has an accident or not will still be a random event. Under a rule of strict liability, her legal responsibility would
thus be uncertain at the time she sets out but it is not an uncertainty that
worries us.
Alternatively, these senses of "certainty" might not apply to decision-relevant facts in the world but to the nature of the legal rule. Adjudicative outcomes might depend on some random device, such as flipping
a coin, or, in a panel judicial system unconstrained by stare decisis and in
which the various judges differed in their substantive values, upon the
judge drawn to decide the case. Then a flip of the coin or the drawing of
the judge to hear one's case would determine the outcome. This outcome
would then be unpredictable (ex ante) to agents and to judges.
"Certainty" justifications for stare decisis often include "reliance"
or "planning" arguments, but these arguments are only as strong as the
value of the planned conduct. Planning requires each agent to formulate
expectations about the future, including any future legal obligations. Expectations about legal obligations depend not only on the prevailing legal
rule but also on the prevailing judicial practice. If the system does not
adhere to stare decisis, no one will formulate expectations about her future legal obligations on that assumption. On this account, not maintenance of expectations per se, but the desirability of the expectations
generated by stare decisis justifies the practice.
V.

UNCERTAINTY OF VALUES:

THE ECONOMICS OF RELIANCE

JUSTIFICATIONS

The desirability of stare decisis then would appear to depend on the
substantive values that the system of adjudication seeks to promote. At
first glance, a justification for stare decisis that depends on the substantive values of the system suggests that, in non-unitary court systems, disagreement among the judges over the substantive values they ought to
promote would undermine any claim to stare decisis. Judicial disagreement over substantive values, however, does not necessarily imply disagreement over the value of stare decisis, at least in certain limited
circumstances. The classical example of this occurs in "coordination
games" in which, it is said, the legal rule serves to identify at which of
several equilibria the social system will arrive.
Consider the game represented by the matrix in Figure 1. There are
two players, Row and Column, each of whom must choose one of two
actions. The numbers in each cell represent the value to Row and Col-
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umn respectively of their joint, though uncoordinated, choices. In this
simple coordination game, the players are indifferent between the outcomes (L,L) and (R,R) but they prefer either of these outcomes to a failure to coordinate their actions.
Column
L

R

L

1,1

0,0

R

0,0

1,1

Row

FIGURE 1

Simple Coordination Game
In the absence of any structure beyond that embodied in the matrix,
neither Row nor Column has any basis for forming an expectation as to
the behavior of the other party. Expectations may be created by legal
rules though. A legal rule that identified the appropriate action for each
party in these circumstances as "L" (or, equally, as "R") would provide
each actor with a basis on which to formulate an expectation of the other
actor's choice; one equilibrium would be singled out and the desired coordination achieved.
Of course, though the actors are indifferent between (L,L) and
(R,R), the judges need not be. One judge might prefer (L,L) and another
judge (R,R). If Row and Column are uncertain which judge will hear
their case, they no longer have any basis on which to coordinate their
actions. The judicial disagreement over desirable equilibria represents a
disagreement in substantive values. If the judges agree, however, that
coordination is preferred to its lack then they each have a reason to adhere to the initial decision in the case.
The coordination-game argument for stare decisis is strongest in the
panel model of courts. In this model, the actors Row and Column would
always face the uncertainty created by the random draw of a judge from
the panel. In the unitary and hierarchical systems, this argument has no
force as the values of the single judge at the top would provide a clear
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signal to the actors. 27 In the sequential system, the prospective changes
in judges would introduce some uncertainty into the actors' choices but if
each judge presided for an extended period she might consider the abandonment of stare decisis desirable if her preference for one equilibrium
over the other were sufficiently strong.
The conventional interpretation of Figure 1 is that "L" represents
the action "drive on the left side of the street" and "R" the action "drive
on the right side of the street." This interpretation illustrates how limited a range of application these games provide for stare decisis. Institutions of empowerment, such as contract or property, offer the most
compelling illustrations of judge made rules that might rely on the above
coordination game justification for stare decisis.
Consider, for example, contract. A rule such as caveat emptor or
caveat venditur allocates various risks among the parties and hence affects the price at which transactions occur. Both buyer and seller prefer
stable rules to ones on which they cannot rely; under stable rules they
can achieve identical results with less detailed contracts and a price
adjustment.
Rules imposing primary obligations on actors seem less likely to
have the structure of a pure coordination game. These games may have
multiple equilibria but the parties are likely to have conflicting preferences among these equilibrium outcomes. 2 Moreover, the appeal of any
equilibrium rather than none may be less. Consider the game represented by the matrix in Figure 2:

27. In the hierarchical system, the situation is more complex as appeals might be costly or not
as of right. In that case, if it were clear which jurisdiction (and hence which judge) would hear the
case no problem would arise.
28. Pure coordination games are characterized by at least two attributes. First, the interests of
the players are perfectly coincident. Second. the game has multiple equilibria. The "coordinating"
role for law derives from the multiplicity of equilibria and not from the coincidence of interest.
Coincidence of interest apparently plays an important role because we assume implicitly that the
social objective coincides with the individuals' interests. When individual interests diverge, as in the
game of figure 2 below, each individual need not prefer that her undesirable (pure strategy) equilibrium prevail over no (pure strategy) equilibrium. A policymaker, however. may still prefer that a
single (pure strategy) equilibrium be identified.
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Row

a

Column
b

c

A

5,3

7,1

1,2

B

3,2

4,6

0,4

4

3

4,3

3,2

1
C

S

I

2,5

I

FIGURE 2

Non-Equivalent but InterchangeableEquilibria
Here, (A,a) and (C,c) are both equilibria. 29 Suppose that Liza favors
Column and hence prefers the equilibrium (C,c) but that Henry favors
Row and hence prefers the equilibrium (A,a). The argument for stare
decisis in the coordination game rested on Liza's and Henry's agreement
that either of the equilibria was preferable to the uncertainty generated
by "uncertainty" in the legal rule. In the game in Figure 2, Liza's preference for Column might outweigh the "losses" occasioned by legal uncertainty, particularly in a sequential model of courts. Even in a panel
system, however, neither judge may see a reason to adhere to prior decisions. Both Row and Column might do better with the legal rule "uncertain" than she would do if the legal rule were clear but unfavorable to
30
her.
Thus far, the justification of stare decisis has relied both on at least
29. I use the concept of Nash equilibrium to identify "solutions" to the games in figures I and
2. In a Nash equilibrium, neither actor can unilaterally improve her payoff. Thus, in figure 2. (Aa)
is an equilibrium because Row cannot improve upon her payoff of 5, conditional on Column's choice
of strategy a. If Row chooses B rather than A she would receive 3; if she chooses C rather than A
she would receive 4. Similarly, Column cannot improve his payoff of 3, conditional on Row's choice
of strategy A. If Column chooses b rather than a, he receives I rather than 3; if he chooses c rather
than a, he receives 2 rather than 3. A parallel argument reveals that (C,c) is also an equilibrium.
No other pair of choices meets this criterion of each actor's choice being her best response to
her opponent's chosen strategy. Consider for example the strategy pair (B,b) which makes Column
best off. This pair is not an equilibrium because, conditional on Column's choice of b. Row does best
to choose A, which gives her a payoff of 7 rather than 4.
30. It is difficult to provide a formal analysis. The payoffs in the games represented in the text
are the "pre-legal system" payoffs. To analyze rigorously the effects of the legal rules (or uncertainty
in the legal rule) requires a theory of how the legal rule alters the game that the actors play. The
standard coordination-game argument in the legal literature seems to assume that the legal rule
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some limited agreement about substantive values and on unpredictability
as to which values would apply to any given case. One might ask
whether unpredictability of changes in the world may substitute for value
unpredictability in this justification of stare decisis. In section VI, I shall
argue that, under certain circumstances, changes in the world, whether
predictable or not, may justify stare decisis, at least for certain shared,
substantive values.
VI.

UNCERTAINTY IN THE WORLD: THE ECONOMICS OF
FLEXIBILITY JUSTIFICATIONS

In this section, I assume that the substantive values of the court are
constant but that the world varies in one of two ways. First, I consider a
model in which the world is uncertain. Next I modify a model of Blume
and Rubinfeld 3 to provide a justification for a rule of stare decisis when
a court faces a predictably changing world. As substantive values are
constant,, the arguments in this section will justify stare decisis in the
least favorable context: that of a unitary court.
More interesting perhaps than the results themselves, the models reveal how difficult it is to construct a situation in which a changing world
justifies stare decisis. Section A outlines the model. Section B traces the
leaves the payoff structure unchanged; it simply identifies (by making common knowledge) which of
the equilibria the parties will play.
This view of the effect of the legal rule, however, ignores that most legal rules have sanctions.
The legal rule thus alters the payoff structure the actors face. Uncertainty about the legal rule
therefore implies that actors will be uncertain which game they are playing. An actor's optimal
strategy in these circumstances will then depend on the specific structure of the derivative games and
the probabilities that each derivative game will be played.
For a related discussion, see L. Kornhauser, Conceptions of Social Rule, in The Logic of Social
Change (D. Braybrooke ed. forthcoming).
31. Blume & Rubinfeld, The Dynamics of the Legal Process, II J. LEGAL STUD. 405 (1982).
Blume and Rubinfeld study a model of an accident situation which differs in several ways from that
set out in Section III(A) above. First, in each of the three periods of the model, the actors choose
only levels of care. Second, the court chooses standards of care within a regime of negligence with
contributory negligence rather than between regimes. Under the standard assumptions of the economic analysis of accident law, set out in, tor example, S. SHAVEL[_, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AcciDENT LAW (1987), both the static social optimum and the individual choices of care levels depend
on the relative costs of taking care. In Blume and Rubinfeld, these costs change randomly over time.
In addition, each agent faces a "cost of adjustment" when it alters its level of care from one period to
the next.
The court seeks to minimize not simply the sum of the static costs of accidents and accident
prevention but also the costs of adjustment that the agents face. The major result of the article states
that the standards of care optimal under this substantive value of the minimization of the sum of
accident costs, prevention costs and adjustment costs are neither those standards that minimize the
total costs of accidents in the present nor those that minimize the expected total costs of accidents in
the future. More specifically, the court should abandon stare decisis and continually adjust the
prevailing standard of care.
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logic of the argument. Section C discusses some difficulties in formulating a model.
A.

Outline of the Model

Recall what conditions the model must satisfy. At time 0, the court
announces a legal rule that is best, given the world at time 0. At some
later time t*, a different legal rule would be best, absent the prior decision
but, given the prior decision, the court adheres to the old rule at least up
to some time T later than t*.
The prior discussion identifies several elements that the model must
specify. First, the world must be described. Recall the example of accidents arising between drivers and pedestrians. The frequency of accidents (and the amount of losses from them) depended upon the choices
of activity level (say miles driven for the driver and miles walked by the
pedestrian) and care level of both driver and pedestrian. Each actor derived benefits from her activity and incurred costs in taking care. The
world then can be characterized by five parameters: the functional relation between the driver's choice of activity level and the benefits she receives; the functional relation between the pedestrian's choice of activity
level and the benefit he receives; the cost of care to the driver; the cost of
care to the victim; and the functional relation between the extent of accident losses and the choices of care and activity levels of both parties.
Adapting this model to the study of stare decisis requires two
changes. A sixth parameter, adjustment costs, is added. Adjustment
costs represent costs that the agents incur when the court changes the
legal rule. These costs might arise because, when the legal rule changes,
an agent may make a radical change in her behavior and such radical
changes often require new investments or other costly adaptations. Finally, as the model studies "flexibility" justifications of stare decisis,
some change must be introduced into the world. I shall assume that all
parameters are constant except the benefit functions of the agents. The
model must, of course, specify how the benefit functions change with
time. Specifically, one wishes to distinguish, as noted in section IV C,
between predictable change and unpredictable change. As is argued below, uncertainty in the sense of unpredictable change plays only a limited
role in the justification of stare decisis.
Second, the choices open to the court must be identified. I assume
that the court chooses between two patterns of liability: negligence with
contributory negligence (or "negligence" for short) and strict liability
with dual contributory negligence ("strict liability" for short). The court
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makes this choice on the basis of its substantive values, assumed here to
be the maximization of social welfare defined as the sum of the benefits to
each party from her choice of activity level minus total social costs. Total social costs have three elements: the costs of care incurred by both
parties, the expected losses from accidents given their choices of care and
32
activity levels, and adjustment costs.
Third, the model relies on a discrepancy between the court's substantive values and its equivalence criteria. The substantive value "maximize social welfare" identifies as equivalent all those and only those cases
for which the values of all the parameters of the problem were identical.
Under these substantively derived equivalence criteria, stare decisis
would never require a court to decide a case wrongly. Consequently, I
shall assume that the court does not consider the parties' benefit functions as relevant to the decision that two cases are identical. 33 Fourth,
the model compares the practice of stare decisis to a practice of no stare
decisis. The court's (and the model's) evaluation of these two practices
depends on differences in the agents' choices under the two practices. As
each agent is assumed economically rational, these choices will be optimal, given the private costs faced by each party. Consequently, the
model must specify how the social losses suffered when the wrong rule
prevails are apportioned between the driver and the pedestrian. 34 In fact,
because negligence and strict liability have different distributional consequences, the non-liability bearing party is better off under the wrong rule
than she is under the correct rule. Thus, if between t* and T strict liability ought to prevail but, due to stare decisis, negligence prevails, the
driver is better off than she would be under strict liability.
B.

The Logic of the Argument

1. The Optimal Pattern of Liability in a Static World
It is well-known that, in general, no legal rule that conditions liability only on the levels of care adopted by the parties, can induce injurer
and victim to adopt those activity and care levels that maximize social
welfare (defined as the sum of the parties' benefits from the activities less
32. Define accident costs as the sum of the costs of care of both parties and the expected losses
from accidents.
33. One defect of the Blume and Rubinfeld model as an analysis of stare decisis derives from its
failure to offer a clear conception of when two cases are identical. Implicitly, their claim that the
court abandons stare decisis rests on criteria that hold two cases equivalent if the actors have
adopted identical levels of care in each instance. As remarked in notes 15 and 19. supra, legal
practice invites this assimilation of equivalence criteria to the facts necessary to the application of a
legal rule.
34. The model must also specify how the costs of adjustment are apportioned.
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the accident's costs). 3 5 The intuition for this result is straightforward. In
equilibrium, under any of the liability rules in use, only one party bears
the expected costs of accidents. The other party, free of these costs, will
adopt an excessively high level of activity.
A court that seeks to maximize social welfare must therefore choose
between strict liability (with dual contributory negligence) and negligence (with contributory negligence) on the basis of which pattern of
liability yields higher social welfare. The choice between strict liability
and negligence thus turns critically on the relative values of the activities
to each party. If these values may change over time, it might be desirable
to alter the legal rule. For instance, if, initially, the value of the injurer's
activity far exceeds the value of the victim's, a rule of negligence would
be appropriate. If the value to the victim of its activity increases relative
to that of the injurer, however, at some point it will be desirable to abandon negligence for strict liability.
2.

Uncertain Change without Adjustment Costs

Let us now introduce uncertainty into this world. Suppose, for example, that the value of pedestrianism is fixed but that the value of driving will either be high or low, with some known probability. If the
driving has a high value, then negligence would be the preferred legal
rule. Conversely if driving has a low value, then strict liability will be
preferred to negligence.
Under a practice of stare decisis, the court would announce a legal
rule and then adhere to it, regardless of the actual value of driving to the
injurer. Under a practice of no stare decisis, the court would announce
the legal rule that was "optimal," given the actual value of the injurer's
activity. Which judicial practice ought a court adopt?
Consider first the practice of stare decisis. Suppose the court announces a rule of negligence. Then, if the value of driving is high, the
statically (second-)best rule will prevail. If, on the other hand, the value
of driving is low, negligence will be far from the statically (second-)best
rule. The higher the probability that driving will have a high value, the
more preferable will negligence (with stare decisis) be to strict liability
(with stare decisis). 36
35. S. SHAVI I., supra note 31, proves this result. It may seem odd that a court that seeks to
minimize social costs restricts its choice of rules to those conditioned only on care levels because no
rule in this class achieves the social optimum. I adopt this assumption here because, in many instances, courts do restrict their choice in precisely this way. They may do so because of difficulties in
administration of rules conditioned ol activity level.
36. Contrast this analysis with that of an apparently unrelated problem. Suppose there are two
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Whether stare decisis should be adopted however will depend on the
nature of the first-best optimum. Suppose the valuations of activities are
such that both injurer and victim should adopt moderate (or low) levels
of the activity. Under stare decisis, the actor who escapes liability will
always adopt a high level of activity. Under a practice of no stare decisis,
however, each actor will be uncertain whether she will bear the cost of an
accident. This uncertainty will induce her to adopt an activity level intermediate to the one she would adopt if she bore the liability for certain
and the one she would adopt if she escaped liability for certain. For
certain relative values of activities, then, the uncertainty over the legal
rule induces the actors to adopt activity levels closer to the social
optimum.
This discussion reveals that the desirability of a practice of stare
decisis will depend on the particular "facts" of the situation the law seeks
to govern. The critical facts in the example are those that identify the
socially optimal equilibrium. A court's decision to adhere to a practice
of stare decisis should thus vary with these critical facts. 37
3. Predictable Change with Adjustment Costs
First, note that, with predictable change, if adjustment costs are
zero, stare decisis is not justifiable. For, consider a world in which adjustment costs are zero and the benefits to the agents of engaging in the
activities are changing predictably. Then, clearly, the court should, in
every period t, announce the statically optimal liability rule. After all, if
the agents know ex ante that in period t the statically optimal legal rule
types of drivers. One with a high valuation of driving and one with a low valuation. The court may
be unable to condition the rule of liability on the type of driver either because of information difficulties or because "equity" prohibits discriminating among types. The choice between negligence and
strict liability would then parallel that described in this paragraph.
No analogue to a practice of no stare decisis exists in this two-type problem, however.
37. We might view the court's position as follows. Given that the court will adhere to stare
decisis, it has only two choices of legal rule: negligence or strict liability. If, however, the court
considers not only which legal rule to adopt but whether to adhere to stare decisis or not, the court
acquires a third legal option: no stare decisis.
The option "no stare decisis" is ambiguous as it does not identify the criterion the court will use
for choosing between negligence and strict liability in any given case. Different scenarios might
arise. The court might adopt a legal rule after inquiring into the benefits each actor received from
her activity. If the court did this perfectly accurately and the parties knew at the time they chose
care and activity levels, this practice would induce the first-best social optimum. In fact, this practice reduces to one of stare decisis in which the equivalence criteria are derived from the substantive
value "maximize social welfare." To derive a more plausible practice of "no stare decisis" we must
either introduce error into judicial determination of the benefits or imagine that the choice between
strict liability and negligence is driven by some other consideration. In a panel model, some judges
might favor negligence and others strict liability; the probability that a rule of negligence would
prevail would thus depend on the probability that a negligence judge would be drawn from the panel.
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will prevail, they incur no adjustment costs in conforming their behavior
to that standard.
Now suppose that adjustment costs are positive. Thus, when the
legal rule changes, each party must incur some cost to adapt their behavior to that which would be individually optimal for them, given the new
legal rule. The court seeks to maximize social welfare which consists of
the (discounted) flow of benefits from the activities less the flow of total
social costs. Social costs now include not only the costs of taking care
and the expected accident costs but also the costs of adjustment. 38
An analysis of the desirability of stare decisis depends on three factors as yet unspecified: (1) precisely how the legal rule changes over
time; (2) how the adjustment costs are divided between injurer and victim; and (3) how the injurer and the victim divide the social losses incurred when the inefficient rule prevails.
As before, the best static rule depends on the relative values of the
activities to driver and pedestrian. Assume that, at the outset, the value
of driving far outweighs the value of pedestrianism so that negligence
would be the best static rule. Assume further that, as time passes, the
value of pedestrianism gradually increases, so that, after some future
time t*, the best static rule will always be strict liability. 39 Further assume that the driver bears some fixed proportion q of the adjustment
cost.

In the accident example, society consists solely of the driver and
pedestrian. The total social loss must therefore fall entirely on them. In
fact, the social loss divides in a peculiar way. Suppose that the statically
optimal rule would be strict liability but that negligence prevails instead.
Then the driver is better off under the wrong rule than she would be
under strict liability. For, under strict liability, she both adopts a lower
level of activity (which means the benefits of her activity are less) and she
must bear the costs of accidents (which implies her costs are higher).
Conversely, the individual losses to the pedestrian exceed the social loss
38. The court might instead seek to maximize average social welfare. The choice of social
objective function depends in part on the assumption made on how the world changes. See infra
note 39.
39. In this formulation, then, one can identify the state of the world, which is defined by the
values of the two activities, with the date at which the activities occur. This assumption is peculiar
to the assumption on the "motion" of the underlying state; it moves uniformly in one direction. If
the values of driving first fell then rose relative to the value of pedestrianism, the statically optimal
rule would change more than once. (In this context, one might assume that the court seeks to
maximize average social welfare rather than the discounted present value of social welfare.) Nor
could one identify the state of the world with the date.
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as the sum of "losses" to driver and pedestrian must equal the total social
loss.
To compare judicial practices, one must determine how each agent
will behave in response to each practice. Suppose that a practice of no
stare decisis prevails. Then both parties know that the legal rule will
change from negligence to strict liability at t*. As the pedestrian no
4
longer bears the costs of accidents, he will increase his level of activity. 0
The injurer must now decide whether to restrict her level of driving. She
will do so when the present discounted value of reduced liability expenditures exceeds her share qK of the adjustment costs.
Before considering how the two agents behave under a practice of
(limited) stare decisis, one must understand what such a practice means
in the context of this example. A court that had a practice of strict stare
decisis would adhere to a rule of negligence for all time, regardless of
how valuable pedestrianism becomes relative to driving. 4' Less stringent
practices of stare decisis can be defined as well: the court adheres to
negligence until some time T after t*. 4 2 During the interval between t*
and T, negligence applies even though strict liability would be statically
optimal; the court adheres to a legal rule it knows to be "wrong." The
stringency of stare decisis can thus be measured by the length of time T43
t* that the statically inefficient rule will prevail.
How will the agents behave under some practice T-t* of stare decisis? As long as negligence prevails, neither agent will have any reason to
incur her share of the adjustment costs. When the rule changes at date
T, however, the pedestrian will, as under a practice of no stare decisis,
immediately incur the adjustment costs and increase her activity level.
The driver, on the other hand, will compare her share of the costs of
adjustment to her expected discounted costs of adhering to her prior behavior. She may not decrease her activity level until T', when the cost of
adhering exceeds the cost of adjusting.
Clearly, in some instances, a court will prefer limited stare decisis to
40. This assumes, of course, that the discounted value of the increased activity level exceeds his
share (l-q)K of the adjustment costs.
41. Or, conversely, at time 0, when negligence was optimal, the court could adopt a rule of
strict liability and adhere to it forever.
42. More precisely, the court adheres to negligence until the value of pedestrianism exceeds
that of driving by some margin. The text can talk of dates rather than states because, in the particular example, the two are identified.
43. Or. as in footnote 42, the stringency can be measured by the extent to which the value of
pedestrianism must exceed that value at which strict liability would become optimal. Another neasure might be the lowest static social loss at which the court will revise the rule. No stare decisis
would then be identified with a social loss of 0 and strict stare decisis with an infinite static social
loss.
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no stare decisis. One may understand this by considering the excess social costs that may be incurred under no stare decisis. Since, under no
stare decisis, the driver may not reduce her activity level until some time
T', over the interval t*to T', the static social costs incurred under no
stare decisis may exceed those that would occur under stare decisis. After all, absent the adjustment costs, the driver would prefer to reduce her
activity level, a choice which would also reduce the expected number of
accidents.
If the (static) equilibrium behavior under strict liability is close to
the statically optimal behavior, then the driver's failure to adjust her activity level down (coupled with the pedestrian's increase in her activity
level) will increase static losses over those incurred under a negligence
rule. Moreover, the court could eliminate these additional static losses
by following a practice of stare decisis to date T'; at T, when strict liability comes into force, the driver will immediately adopt the lower activity
level. Prior to T', both driver and pedestrian will adhere to their equilibrium levels of activity under negligence, hence avoiding the excess
losses. 44 In some contexts, therefore, a court will maximize social welfare by adhering to a legal rule that fails to maximize social welfare in the
particular period.
C. Modeling Difficulties
Formulating a model of stare decisis presents considerable difficulties. A brief exposition of these difficulties may clarify both choices that
may appear odd to lawyers and those that appear odd to economists.
As stare decisis is a judicial practice, the decisions of the agents subject to the legal rule may seem extraneous. A model would then simply
specify the costs (from a social perspective) of allowing the wrong rule to
prevail and the costs incurred in changing the rule. On the other hand,
even for purely self-interested agents acting economically rationally, the
social costs incurred may depend on how the agents respond to the various legal rules the court might announce. 45 The agents' responses may in
44. In fact the court can increase social welfare beyond that achieved under a practice of stare
decisis to date T'. In general, the driver will adjust her activity level too early for two reasons. First,
because, in any period, her loss from failure to adjust exceeds the static social loss, the driver's
expected discounted costs of non-adjustment exceed the expected discounted social costs of nonadjustment. Second, the driver bears only part of the adjustment costs while society cares about the
date at which the pedestrian incurs his share of the adjustment costs. As her costs of adjustment are
lower and her benefits to adjustment greater than the social values, the driver will incur the costs of
adjustment sooner than socially desirable. If the court maintains the rule of negligence to the socially optimal transition date, the driver will wait until that date to incur her share of the costs.
45. The behavioral response of individual agents will matter to any court that evaluates legal
rules at least in part in terms of the social consequences of those legal rules.
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turn depend on the type of conduct regulated by the rule so that the
effects and desirability of a practice of stare decisis may vary from one
legal realm to another.
Attention to the specific legal context serves a further purpose. It
ensures that the interpretation of the model is grounded in actual legal
practice. Justification of stare decisis in the abstract relies on distinctions
between substantive and formal values and among sources of error, the
practical content of which is elusive in the absence of a concrete example.
One might wonder, however, why the concrete example chosen is
both so complex and so unrealistic. Two features of the accident example may appear overly complex: the attention to two rather than one
actor; and the choice of both activity and care levels rather than of care
levels alone. If the decisions of only one actor determine social welfare, a
practice of no stare decisis (conjoined with the appropriate substantive
legal rule) will be optimal. In the accident context, one simply imposes
strict liability on the lone actor who then faces the social objective function and will choose as the social decisionmaker would desire. 46 In a
model which considers two actors, each of whom chooses a care level
only, courts ought not, as Blume and Rubinfeld showed, adhere to a
prior decision. 47 Neither should the courts announce the rule that would
be best given the actual cost parameters faced by the parties. Rather,
some "generalized" practice of stare decisis in which the court abandons
the prior rule by moving towards the statically optimal rule proves ideal.
VII.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This essay has criticized and in part reconstructed some legal analyses and justifications of the practice of stare decisis. Though I have offered no formal model nor often resorted to such economic concepts as
marginal costs or efficiency, various aspects of the economic analysis of
law have informed and motivated the argument. These concluding remarks discuss this economic perspective.
Any justification of stare decisis must identify the practice as the
"optimal" solution to some decision problem. Formulating the appropri46. This identity of interest between the actor and the judge depends critically on the choice of
the social objective function as maximization of social welfare.
47. Moreover, contrary to the standard assumption of economic analysis of accident law. the
standards of care do not identify a precise care level to which the agent must adhere. Rather, the
standard imposes a reasonable person test. This test, to the extent it responds to changes in the
relevant economic parameters of cost of care and expected accident losses, holds an agent to a standard that adjusts as the parameters change.
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ate decision problem has presented the major difficulty in analyzing stare
decisis, a difficulty that has manifested itself in this essay in several ways.
First, one must identify a decision maker and the objective that decision maker seeks to further. In this context, one might consider the designer of a court system who must decide what practices to require of the
judges who will decide cases. Throughout the essay, I have generally
assumed that the designer shared the values of the judges who would
preside in the system and that these values would determine the relative
desirability of a practice of stare decisis to one of no stare decisis. 48
These values have generally been left implicit rather than explicit but one
might regard the proffered justifications of fairness and certainty in part
as suggested aims of the designer. Additionally, we have seen that the
paradox of stare decisis most often emerges only when the substantive
values of the judges differ from the criteria that determine when two
cases are equivalent.
Second, each of the four models of the court system suggests a different decision problem. The structure of the court system determines in
part the environment in which judges decide; it may also affect our understanding of the objectives that the designer of the legal system seeks to
further in her selection of judicial practices. In the unitary model, for
example, we may most easily assimilate the objectives of the designer to
the substantive values of the judge who must decide all cases. In the
hierarchical model, by contrast, we may most easily imagine conflict between the systemic aims of the designer and the substantive values of
individual judges, even of the judges on the highest court.
Third, the model in section VI revealed the complex structure of the
designer's decision problem. The designer chooses a practice to which
judges will respond "optimally," that is, each judge will further her interests given the practice to which she must adhere. To further her interests, however, the judge must consider how individual agents, or citizens,
will respond to the legal rules she announces. The designer's decision
problem thus contains two nested problems: the decision problem of the
judge and the game defined by the judicially announced legal rule and
played by the citizens. 49 The discussion in section VI in fact collapsed
48. The model in Section V deviates somewhat from this position. There we examined a panel
model in which different judges had different substantive values. The designer, of course, could not
consistently hold both sets of values. A full analysis must thus take one of two tacks. It must
impute an explicit objective function to the designer that she seeks to maximize in light of the various objectives of judges. Or it must look for some "'overlapping" consensus of the judges on some
values that each believes should be furthered.
49. The study of stare decisis thus adds a layer to the typical economic analysis of legal duties.
For a discussion of that structure, see Kornhauser, supra note 2.
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the analysis by assimilating the designer's goal to the substantive values
of the single judge.
An economic perspective does not resolve the problems presented by
stare decisis but it has, I hope, clarified them. The specification of a simple economic model requires us to state more precisely the questions that
the practice of stare decisis poses. When stated clearly, these questions
reveal how inadequate our answers to these questions and our understanding of stare decisis have been.

